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“A fair and impartial judiciary is a cornerstone of the rule of law 
and democracy.”1 Since 1947, the New Jersey Supreme Court2 has 
served as a model for the nation. This is primarily because its judges 
have historically been “evaluated on their merits, their legal ability, 
their demonstrated understanding of the law and their integrity.”3   
 
The Court’s national reputation as a judicial leader is also in large 
part because its judges are appointed, rather than elected.4 While politics 
have always been relevant to judicial selection, the framers of the 1947 
New Jersey Constitution built a system where ‘partisan gamesmanship’ 
did not “interfere with the ability of judges to be impartial and 
independent.”5 
Recently, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s decision not to 
“reappoint a sitting Supreme Court justice,” the first time any New 
Jersey governor has done so, “marks a critical turning point that is an 
affront to the integrity” of the State’s justice system.6 His actions 
sparked a period of political controversy pitting all three branches of the 
state government against each other in a struggle to fill the empty seat 
on the bench and shape the Court. 
This incident interjected the topic of judicial independence into the 
focus of many lawyers and judges across New Jersey.7 This is a pivotal 
moment for the modern New Jersey judiciary; the independence and 
legitimacy of the Court is in jeopardy.8 Governor Christie’s decision 
deeply shook the pillars of the state’s legal establishment. 
No governor before now attempted “to control the Third Branch of 
government through” the judicial reappointment process.9 In the 
 
1 The Bar Report: Weekly News from the New Jersey State Bar Association, A Case for 
Independence on the Bench, 200 N.J. L. J.  18, 18 (2010). 
2 All references to the “Supreme Court” or to the “Court” refer to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.  The United States Supreme Court is only referenced in full.     
3 Allen A. Etish, A Suffocating Message to the Judiciary, 200 N.J. L. J. 407, 407 (2010). 
4 The Bar Report, supra note 1. 
5 Id. 
6 Etish, supra note 3. 
7 The Bar Report, supra note 1. 
8 Etish, supra note 3. 
9 Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court: Robert L. Clifford, 
James H. Coleman, Jr., Marie L. Garibaldi, Alan B. Handler, Stewart G. Pollock, Deborah 
T. Poritz, Gary S. Stein and James R. Zazzali (May 13, 2010), available at 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nj/Retired_%20Justices_on_Wallace.pdf. 
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aftermath of the Governor’s actions, Chief Justice Stuart Rabner 
appointed Justices on an ad hoc basis to fill the empty seat. The Senate, 
in turn, initiated a political stalemate by refusing to confirm Governor 
Christie’s candidate, Anne Patterson, for a recess appointment 
nomination.10 Though each branch acted within the realm of its 
authority, these actions reflect poor foresight and temperance because 
the political repercussions damaged, and could further harm, the New 
Jersey political system. The 1947 state constitution ascribes a role to 
each branch of government; these roles must be honored to preserve the 
dignity of each. Concurrently, it is appropriate to ask if the time has 
arrived to alter the system after sixty-four years of experience under the 
current constitution. Is the present method as good as any for placing 
new justices on the State Supreme Court expeditiously and effectively? 
What are the alternatives to improving the administration of justice?  
Can we determine whether one of these alternatives would be more 
workable in New Jersey? The time is ripe for reconsideration. 
The state constitution sets forth the respective roles of New 
Jersey’s “Governor and Senate in the nomination and appointment of 
members of the judiciary.”11 The Constitution retains “the state’s 
traditional method of judicial selection for judges: . . . gubernatorial 
appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate.”12 This system 
has been “in effect since 1844,”13 and “proposed changes were 
unheeded.”14 
A plethora of issues can, however, arise in conjunction with this 
rule, especially if the governor makes an unpopular decision. What 
happens if the Senate continues to refuse to act on the Governor’s 
nomination? Can the Governor circumvent the Senate’s refusal and 
appoint any Justice he so chooses? Can the Chief Justice continue to use 
retired or lower court Justices to fill the vacancy until the Senate 
confirms the Governor’s appointee? With a gubernatorial-senatorial 
 
10 Richard Pérez-Peña, Appointment Fight Divides Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, 
at A19. 
11 Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 164 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1969) 
(quoting N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 1). 
12 Margaret Gordon Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 
721, 721 (1974) (referencing N.J. Const. art. VI, §6, para. 1). 
13 Id. at 721 (quoting N.J. Const. art. VII, §2, para. 1 (1844)).  
14 Id. For an analysis of the successes and failures of court reformers at the 1947 
convention and an appraisal of their goals, see Wolinsky, Arthur T. Vanderbilt: The 
Amending Hand (1958) (unpublished Honors thesis, Princeton University) (on file with the 
State Library at Trenton). 
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standoff, the Court could ultimately become null if it fails to issue 
legitimate opinions. It is imperative that any future action is mindful of 
the doctrines of separation of powers, constitutional interpretation, and 
democratic accountability.15 
This Note begins in Part I with an overview of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court as it stands today, beginning with Governor Chris 
Christie’s decision not to renominate Justice Wallace for life tenure. 
Part II presents the New Jersey State Constitution and governing rules 
for composition of the Court. Part III inquires whether each of the 
branches of government has the power to take action in the manner that 
occurred. Part IV proposes that the branches have this textual power, yet 
they should refrain or proceed with caution because the political 
repercussions could cause grave damage to the New Jersey political 
system. This Note concludes in Part V with a critique of the existing 
processes and proposals for a new solution. New Jersey needs new laws 
and a new system to prevent this situation from happening again. The 
problem exists here because it is unclear which branch of government 
would be best to accomplish such a move. Most importantly, each 
branch must exercise its legitimate power to produce a logical, working 
result. 
 I. GOVERNOR CHRISTIE’S DECISION NOT TO REAPPOINT 
JUSTICE WALLACE 
On May 3, 2010, Governor Christopher J. Christie declined to 
reappoint sitting Justice John E. Wallace, Jr. to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court.16 Justice Wallace became the first New Jersey Supreme Court 
Justice to seek reappointment but be denied by a governor since the 
state constitution was adopted sixty-four years ago.17  Justice Wallace, at 
age sixty-eight, would have faced mandatory retirement in a mere two 
years18 because of the state’s mandatory retirement age.19 
Governor “Christie’s decision not to reappoint Wallace to a 
tenured term was widely criticized as undermining judicial 
 
15 Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable 
Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1427 (1998). 
16 Richard Pérez-Peña, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A22. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 3. The mandatory retirement age is 70. 
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independence.”20 During his gubernatorial campaign, Governor Christie 
vowed to nominate “conservative justices who would interpret the law 
rather than legislate from the bench.”21 As a result of his actions, six of 
the seven members of the Governor’s advisory panel for prospective 
candidates for state trial courts resigned.22 Retired justices also voiced 
their opinion on the matter, vilifying Governor Christie.23 Among their 
criticisms was that, without a seventh justice, the Court is more likely to 
decide cases in a tie, effectively making the Appellate Division the 
deciding level.24 
Governor Christie subsequently chose attorney Anne Patterson to 
replace Justice Wallace. The nomination was stalled for over one year, 
however, by the refusal of Senate Majority Leader Stephen Sweeney to 
hear this nomination; Senator Sweeney accused the governor of 
favoring “rank politics and ideology [over] practical experience” to hold 
confirmation hearings.25 The Democratic majority in the state senate, 
which holds the power to approve or reject judicial nominees, said it 
would not consider Patterson’s nomination until Wallace’s tenured term 
 
20 Mary Pat Gallagher, Constitution, Rules in Conflict Over Way To Temporarily Fill 
Court Seat, 201 N.J. L. J. 553, 553 (2010). See also Henry Gottlieb, One of Wallace’s 
Closing Opinions Is A Broadside at Intrusive Police Searches, 201 N.J. L. J. 1, 1 (2010) 
(“[I]n a break with tradition that ignited a protest by eight former justices and other 
members of the state’s legal establishment, Christie declined to renominate Wallace to the 
tenured seat.”). 
21 Justice John E. Wallace OUSTED: Anne M. Patterson Picked to Replace Only Black 
Justice on NJ Supreme Court by Chris Christie, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/04/justice-john-e-wallace-
ou_n_562640.html. Justice Wallace was also the only African-American justice appointed 
to the Supreme Court at the time, causing Governor Christie’s decision to receive much 
criticism beyond the scope of the focus of this Note. 
22 Editorial, Judicious Advice, 200 N.J. L. J. 856, 856 (2010). 
23 “Gov. Christie’s assault on the independence of the judiciary, a co-equal branch of 
our government, should be offensive to every lawyer who values separation of powers and 
who was taught to believe that cases are decided on the facts and the law and not because a 
judge is afraid that if the governor disagrees with his decision his reappointment will be in 
jeopardy.” Peter C. Paras, Letter to the Editor, Christie’s Action on Wallace was Poor 
Governance, 200 N.J. L. J. 469, 469 (2010). In 2006, by Executive Order No. 36, Gov. Jon 
Corzine established a judicial advisory panel, whose mission is to evaluate and to provide 
confidential advice to the governor on the abilities of potential judicial candidates. Recently, 
six of the seven members of that panel, including retired Chief Justice Deborah Poritz and 
three other retired justices, resigned in protest over Gov. Chris Christie’s refusal to 
reappoint Justice John Wallace Jr. to the Supreme Court. Editorial, Judicious Advice, 200 
N.J. L. J. 856, 856 (2010). 
24 Gallagher, supra note 20. 
25 Pérez-Peña, supra note 16. 
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would have expired in 2012.26 
In the interim, Chief Justice Rabner utilized lower court and retired 
judges on an ad hoc basis.27 Following this routine practice, Rabner 
recalled Justice Wallace as a just-retired judge for a short period so he 
could assist with cases argued while he was still on the bench.28 On 
September 8, 2010, Chief Justice Rabner assigned Edwin Stern of the 
Appellate Division to fill Justice Wallace’s vacant Supreme Court seat 
during this political standoff and “to participate in new matters 
presented for the Court’s consideration.”29 
On December 10, 2010, Justice Roberto A. Rivera-Soto stated in 
an abstaining opinion in an otherwise non-controversial case that he 
would abstain from all Supreme Court decisions for an indefinite 
period, due to his belief that the then-current Court membership violated 
the state constitution.30 Justice Rivera-Soto reasoned that the temporary 
appointment is not “necessary” and is therefore unconstitutional.31 
Senator Sweeney subsequently called on Justice Rivera-Soto to resign 
due to his announced intention to refrain from participating in Court 
decisions;32 this move “appear[ed] to be driven by politics, not 
principle.”33 On January 3, 2011, Rivera-Soto sent a letter to Governor 
Christie indicating that he did not wish to be reappointed upon 
expiration of his initial seven-year term on the Court in September 
2011.34 On January 12, 2011, Rivera-Soto did participate in a decision of 
 
26 May Rao, N.J. Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto says he will not seek reappointment, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://articles.philly.com/2011-01-
04/news/26357874_1_reappointment-christie-conservative-judges. 
27 Id.  
28 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Robert Williams of Rutgers Law School-
Camden). 
29 Mary Pat Gallagher, Top Appeals Court Judge Stern To Fill Justice Wallace’s Seat 
Temporarily, 201 N.J. L. J. 857, 857 (2010). 
30 Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 354-72 (2010) (Rivera-Soto, J. 
abstaining).   
31 Id. at 354. 
32 Tom Hester, Sr., N.J. Supreme Court Justice Rivera-Soto abstaining from decisions 
in protest, NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM.COM (Dec. 10, 2010), available at 
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/nj-supreme-court-justice-rivera-soto-abstaining-
from-decisions-in-protest. 
33 Editorial, The Politicization of a Respected Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at 
A23.  
34 Chris Magerian, N.J. Supreme Court Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto tells Gov. Christie 
he doesn’t want to be renominated, NJ.COM (Jan. 3, 2011), available at 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/nj_supreme_court_justice_rober.html. 
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the Court and wrote an opinion indicating that he reconsidered his 
position and would participate in future cases where Judge Stern’s vote 
does not affect the outcome of the case.35 The State Senate passed a 
nonbinding resolution on February 24, 2011 calling for the resignation 
of the Justice.36 
Governor Christie and Democrats in the State Senate reached a 
truce of sorts on May 2, 2011, after a yearlong battle, agreeing to have 
Anne Patterson, the governor’s nominee, considered for a different 
vacancy.37 Senate Democrats refused “to consider the nomination until 
March 2012, when Justice Wallace” would have reached the mandatory 
retirement age.38 Governor Christie simultaneously withdrew Ms. 
Patterson’s initial nomination and instead nominated her for another 
seat on the bench that became vacant on September 1, 2011, calling the 
arrangement “an end to the impasse of the last year.”39 The “stalemate 
over Justice Wallace’s seat continues,” however, and this negotiation 
“bypassed it with a rare tactical retreat.”40 For example, Governor 
Christie said “he would not name any new justices until the Senate . . . 
voted on Ms. Patterson for the Wallace seat,”41 thereby continuing the 
battle over who will sit on the State Supreme Court and defying 
precedent.42 
II. THE 1947 NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION 
The founders of the 1947 Constitution purported to replace an 
outmoded charter for state governance with a simplified and balanced 
framework that became an archetype for other states.43 New Jersey 
became “a leader in court reform when it” adopted a “unified” court 
 
35 Michael Symons, Rivera-Soto reverses course, will vote in some Supreme Court 
cases, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Jan. 12, 2011), available at 
http://blogs.app.com/capitolquickies/2011/01/12/rivera-soto-reverses-course-will-vote-in-
some-supreme-court-cases/. 
36 S.J. Res. 105, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011). 
37 Richard Pérez-Peña, Christie and Democrats Agree to Truce Over Court Seat, N.Y. 





42 Richard Pérez-Peña, New Tangle in Battle Over Court in Trenton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 
2011, at A17. 
43 Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9. 
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plan.44 The members of the Committee on the Judiciary looked to the 
U.S. Constitution for guidance to restructure the multiple courts system 
with overlapping jurisdictions into a flexible, yet streamlined, 
dichotomy and to ensure independence similar to the federal system 
through the process of judicial appointments.45 
The New Jersey Judiciary was plagued with problems prior to the 
adoption of the 1947 constitution.46  Its predecessor, the poorly 
functioning 1844 Constitution, “divided courts and concepts of law and 
equity, to the disadvantage of litigants, and lacked any unifying 
administrative power.”47 Claimants were unsure of the proper forum for 
their assorted petitions in the absence of a unified statewide court 
system.48 The various courts, including their divisions and judges, 
lacked continuity in practice, procedure, and administration. 
The third state constitution49 marked a pivotal moment for the state 
judiciary, allowing the Court to be both revered and reviled.50 The 
 
44 Seiler, supra note 12, at 741. See also J. GAZELL & H. RIEGER, THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL REFORM 10 (1960). The other state was Delaware. Id. 
45 Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9.  
46 See Symposium, The “New Judicial Federalism” and New Jersey Constitutional 
Interpretation, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 823, 823 (1997) (“Prior to the convention in 
1947, New Jersey’s judicial system was described as the worst in the country.”). See also 
Adam G. Yoffie, From Poritz to Rabner: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Statutory 
Jurisprudence over the Past Decade, 2000-2009, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 302, 320 (2011). 
47 Symposium, supra note 46; Yoffie, supra note 46, at 320. 
48 Yoffie, supra note 46, at 320. 
49 New Jersey established its first state constitution in 1776 and ratified new 
constitutions in 1844 and 1947.  See generally N.J. Const. (1776); N.J. Const. (1844); N.J. 
Const. (1947). See THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 
http://www.state.nj.us/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).  
50 John B. Wefing, The Performance of the New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening 
of the Twenty-First Century: New Case, Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 769  
(2001) (noting that “[i]n the years after the Constitution of 1947 was adopted, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court earned a national reputation as an activist, progressive and generally 
liberal state supreme court.”) (citations omitted).  In his 1971 study on the role of judges in 
four state supreme courts (Louisiana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts), Henry 
Glick found that New Jersey judges have a fairly expansive view of their role. According to 
Glick, “[t]he New Jersey judges believe courts make policy and they tend to innovate and 
even make proposals to the state legislature . . . In this way, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
appears to contribute frequently to policy change in the state.”  HENRY ROBERT GLICK, 
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 47 (1971). 
In a speech at Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey, Associate Justice Virginia Long 
proudly stated that the Court “has made clear to all New Jerseyans that our state constitution 
is a separate, valid, and important source of rights for the people of New Jersey.” Virginia 
A. Long, Assoc. Justice, N.J. Supreme Court, The 2006 Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub 
Lecture: The Purple Thread: Social Justice as a Recurring Theme in the Decisions of the 
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constitution’s “centerpiece was the Judicial Article, which gave the new 
Supreme Court unprecedented administrative authority, vested in the 
Chief Justice, to control the administration of all courts in New 
Jersey.”51 The new Court is comprised of seven justices, with five 
justices constituting quorum.52 Upon initial appointment, Justices sit for 
seven years but then must be reappointed and reconfirmed to continue 
sitting on the bench until the age of seventy,53 thereby allowing the 
governor and the senate a potential opportunity to remove judges whose 
performance may not warrant reappointment.54 Additionally, the current 
constitution protects the Court from blatant political interference and 
permits it to establish its own court rules.55 
A. The Governor’s Executive Power 
The New Jersey State Constitution vests the executive power in a 
governor.56 The governor has discretionary power to “nominate and 
appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and 
associate justices of the Supreme CourtFalseNo nomination to such an 
office shall be sent to the Senate for confirmation until after [seven] 
days’ public notice by the Governor.”57 Several stipulations limit the 
 
Poritz Court (Apr. 18, 2006), in 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 533, 548 (2007); see also Yoffie, 
supra note 46. 
51 WILLIAMS, supra note 48, at xv; see also Yoffie, supra note 46, at 320. 
52 N.J. Const.. art. VI, § 2, para. 1.   
53 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 3. See also Edward A. Stelzer, Bearing The Judicial 
Mantle: State Court Enforcement Of The Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 874 
(1993).  
54 Robert J. Martin, Reinforcing New Jersey’s Bench: Power Tools for Remodeling 
Senatorial Courtesy and Refinishing Judicial Selection and Retention, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1, 61 (2000). Instead of one fixed term, another means for ending lifetime tenure would be 
to require judges to undergo reappointment for a series of terms until they eventually 
reached mandatory retirement age. Id. Like the proposal for one fixed term, this concept has 
also been broached in Trenton, but without much enthusiasm. Id. Unless the terms of service 
were shortened significantly from the present length of seven years, this method of 
reoccurring evaluation would not impact many judges in a meaningful way. Even with only 
one reappointment, judges could serve fourteen years. For those who were appointed after 
age fifty-six, one reappointment would suffice to allow them to reach mandatory retirement 
age. For those who were appointed at an earlier age, chances appear good that most would 
be able to continue their judicial careers without fear of termination, since the governor and 
the Senate would likely feel reluctant to remove them after they had already completed 
fourteen years of service. Id.  
55 See id.  
56 N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 1. 
57 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 1. 
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governor regarding who can sit on the Supreme Court.58 
The recess appointment power allows the governor to “fill any 
vacancy occurring in any office during a recess of the Legislature, 
appointment to which may be made by the Governor with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.”59 Such an “ad interim appointment” 
terminates at “the end of the next regular session of the Senate or when” 
a newly confirmed Justice takes office, whichever occurs first.60 The 
U.S. Constitution provides a similar model for this power, which is 
regularly used by presidents to make recess appointments.61 In 1889, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court held, in Fritts v. Kuhl,62 that the “state’s 
recess appointment clause should be interpreted consistently with 
federal practice,” noting that the “‘history of the federal government had 
shown frequent disagreement between the president and the federal 
senate, and the convention could not have supposed that the experience 
of our state government would be different.’”63 The drafters of the 1844 
Constitution “prudently adopted the language of that clause” of the U.S. 
Constitution, “which authorizes the President to fill vacancies” that 
occur during the recess of the U.S. Senate.64 
Accordingly, where a statute or a constitutional provision of 
doubtful importance is adopted in one state from the statutes or 
constitution of another state, it will be presumed that the interpretation 
adopted in the state from which it is taken has been accepted as well as 
the words after a practical construction has been given to the language 
by judicial decision.65 When the members of the 1947 Convention 
borrowed provisions from the constitutions of other states, which had 
already received a judicial construction, they adopted them in view of 
such construction and relied on its correctness.66 
 
 
58 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 2 & 3. 
59 N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 13. 
60 Edward Hartnett, Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong on N.J. Supreme Court 
Appointments, 201 N.J. L. J. 631, 631 (2010). 
61 Id. 
62 51 N.J.L. 191 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1889). 
63 Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 (referencing Fritts, 51 N.J.L. at 191). 
64 Fritts, 51 N.J.L. at 198. 
65 Id. at 198-99. 
66 Id. at 199-200. 
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B. The Senate’s Advice and Consent Power 
The New Jersey Constitution vests the Legislative Branch with the 
power to make the laws of the state.67 In addition, the “Constitution 
requires the state Senate to render its ‘advice and consent’ on 
gubernatorial appointments” to the Supreme Court bench.68 Under the 
formal Senate rules, the Governor must refer all nominations to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, “unless the Senate President directs the 
nomination differently.”69 The Senate Judiciary Committee then 
considers the nomination and recommends either rejection or 
acceptance of the nomination to the senate.70 After receiving due 
consideration by the Senate,71 the entire “Senate then votes on the 
nomination.”72 
C. The Chief Justice’s Administrative Power and the Temporary 
Assignment Power 
“The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the 
administrative head of all the courts in the state.”73 This provision grants 
the Chief Justice full power to assign all Superior Court judges.74 The 
constitution also grants the Chief Justice the power to appoint interim 
judges, known as the “temporary assignment power,”75 by recalling 
 
67 N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, para. 1. 
68 Stelzer, supra note 53, at 874. See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 1 (“The governor 
shall nominate and appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and 
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges of the Superior Court, the Judges of the 
County Courts and the judges of other inferior courts ....”). It should be noted, however, that 
the Senate has the prerogative not to act on a nomination at all. See De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 
N.J. 420, 433 (1993) (Pollock, J., concurring); Rules of the Senate of the State of New 
Jersey, r. 154b (1993) (“All nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during an annual 
session of the Senate shall not be acted upon in a subsequent annual session without being 
again made to the Senate by the Governor.”). 
69 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 427 (quoting Rules of the Senate, r. 150).  
70 Id. (quoting Rules of the Senate, r. 151). 
72 Ricardo Castro, Letter to the Editor, End Impasse Over Patterson’s Nomination To N.J. 
Top Court, 201 N.J. L. J. 688, 688 (2010). 
72 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 427 (quoting Rules of the Senate, r. 152).  
73 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 7, para. 1. The constitution further provides: “He shall appoint 
an Administrative Director to serve at his pleasure.” Id.  
74 John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of 
Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L. J. 701, 724-25 (1998). 
75 “When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior 
Court, senior in service, as provided by the rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily 
in the Supreme Court.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1. 
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retired justices76 or lower court judges.77 Neither “[t]he circumstances in 
which such a temporary replacement will actually be made” nor are the 
candidacy requirements for such a position clear.78 Further, the 
“Supreme Court is empowered to adopt such rules as it deems necessary 
or appropriate for the prompt and efficient administration of justice in 
furtherance of the purposes of this act.”79 
III. EACH BRANCH ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS 
TEXTUALLY GRANTED POWERS 
The constitution clearly vests certain powers within each 
government actor; here, it seems that the Governor, the Senate, and the 
Chief Justice all acted within their respective powers. The Governor - 
and only the Governor - has the ability to decide who to appoint to a 
permanent position on the Supreme Court. The Senate’s influence lies 
in its advice and consent power exercised upon receipt of the governor’s 
nomination, but this is not a mandatory action. The constitution merely 
contemplates that the nomination will not proceed without the advice 
and consent of the Senate. The Constitution also clearly grants the Chief 
Justice the power to utilize a judge for a single case, and no textual 
restriction on a continuance of this method exists. Scholars differ on 
whether the Chief Justice’s power should have a broad or narrow 
interpretation. The present issue does not seem to be whether the 
branches are acting outside of their powers but whether this is an 
effective approach to governance. 
A. Governor Christie Acted Within His Authority 
The constitution clearly vests in the Governor - and only the 
Governor - the ability to decide who to appoint to the Supreme Court. 
The Constitution also empowers the Governor to “fill any vacancy 
occurring in any office during a recess of the Legislature, appointment 
 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-13(a) (West 2010)  (“Subject to rules of the Supreme Court, 
any justice of the Supreme Court who has retired on pension or retirement allowance may, 
with his consent, be recalled by the Supreme Court for temporary service in the Supreme 
Court or elsewhere within the judicial system.”). 
77 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1 (“When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the 
Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the 
Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.”). 
78 Edward Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 
735, 738 (2003). 
79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-13(d) (West 2010). 
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to which may be made by the Governor with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.”80 This is known as the recess appointment power.81 
Is the Governor within his rights to assert the need for “balance” in 
the respective roles of our government’s three branches? The Governor 
of New Jersey holds “one of the broadest appointment powers of any 
chief executive” in the country.82 Federal recess appointments are not 
uncommon and occur under constitutional language comparable to that 
of New Jersey’s.83 This method of judicial appointment and its 
constitutional provision were adopted directly from the United States 
Constitution, which provides that the President “shall nominate, and by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Judges of 
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose 
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be 
established by Law.”84 Under this approach, Governor Christie could 
have acted during a recess this summer. Alternatively, the Governor 
could have acted when the Senate adjourned for the year,85 but he 
 
80 N.J. Const. art. V,  § 1, para. 13.  
81 Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 (quoting N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 13). “Such an 
‘ad interim appointment’ expires at the end of the next regular session of the Senate or when 
a confirmed successor takes office, whichever occurs first. . . . The interim appointment is 
good until the end of the next regular session of the Senate, unless a successor shall be 
sooner appointed and qualify . . . This provision is modeled on a similar provision of the 
U.S. Constitution, and presidents regularly use their power to make recess appointments.” 
Id. 
82 Martin, supra note 54, at 18-19; Stephen B. Wiley, Senatorial Courtesy, 97 N.J. L. J. 
65, 65 (1974). Because the governor of New Jersey is the only statewide, state-elected 
official, he or she has extensive appointment powers, including the power to appoint 
officials who, in many other states, are popularly elected. Id. As previously noted, the 
governor appoints all judges in the state, except for judges of individual municipalities (who 
handle essentially nonindictable criminal and quasi-criminal matters, such as motor vehicle 
and local ordinance violations). Id. Although not quite coextensive with the governor’s 
appointment power, the state Senate’s corresponding power of advice and consent is also 
one of the broadest of any state. Id. For a discussion of the extensive appointment and other 
powers of the chief executive in New Jersey, see CHARLES E. JACOB, THE GOVERNOR, THE 
BUREAUCRACY, AND STATE POLICY MAKING, IN POLITICS IN NEW JERSEY 176-78 (Alan 
Rosenthal & John Blydenburgh eds., 1979). 
83 Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution reads: “The President shall have 
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 3. 
84 Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 169 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1969) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).  
85 Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631. See also Fritts v. Kuhl, 51 N.J.L. 191, 193 (N.J. Sup. 
Ct. 1889). The court held that the state’s recess appointment clause should be interpreted in 
light of  federal practice: 
OKS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:47 PM 
144 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL Vol. 36:1 
declined to do so. 
This power allows Governor Christie to reshape the court in his 
image with new appointments.86 The Governor, in exercising his or her 
executive power, has the power to overcome gridlock and prevent 
complete paralysis.87 Governor Christie’s actions were a poor choice in 
the exercise of his gubernatorial power, however, because his lack of 
respect for state tradition led to unnecessary discord among the other 
branches, state officials, and New Jersey residents.88 
 
In order, therefore, to ascertain its true meaning, in accordance with the 
recognized rules of interpretation, we must seek for the reason and spirit of it, 
having regard to the effects and consequences of the construction adopted, and 
the source from which the language employed was derived. Was it intended 
merely to prevent those offices from remaining vacant, which became so during 
the recess of the legislature by some casualty, or was it to prevent any of the 
enumerated offices from remaining vacant during the recess of the senate, 
without regard to when or how the vacancy occurred? The latter clause of 
section 2, article 2, of the federal constitution, adopted in 1787, provides that 
“the president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during 
the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end 
of their next session. 
Id. 
86 Pérez-Peña, supra note 16. 
87 Fritts, 51 N.J.L. at 203. The court elaborated on the Governor’s executive power, as 
articulated in Article 5 of the state constitution:  
Without detriment to the public, there are times when the legislature is not in 
session to pass laws, and the courts not in session to interpret and administer 
them, but it is absolutely necessary that the executive power shall always be 
capable of exercise. There is no point of time when the governor may not be 
called upon to enforce the laws, and there should be no time when he is 
incapable of acting. He cannot exercise all the executive power himself; he must 
act through the agency of others. He cannot hold the courts or perform the 
duties required of his appointees. When, therefore, we reflect that that the 
constitution has most carefully guarded against a vacancy in the office of 
governor, and vested in him alone the power to appoint certain officers to 
perform the most essential functions of government, and that upon him alone 
the duty is imposed to see that the laws are faithfully executed, we must be 
persuaded that the power conferred was intended to be commensurate with the 
duty required. 
Id. 
88 See Paras, supra note 23 (“Gov. Christie’s assault on the independence of the 
judiciary, a co-equal branch of our government, should be offensive to every lawyer who 
values separation of powers and who was taught to believe that cases are decided on the 
facts and the law and not because a judge is afraid that if the governor disagrees with his 
decision his reappointment will be in jeopardy.”). 
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B. The Senate Acted Within its Authority 
The Senate’s advice and consent power is a “procedural device that 
the framers of the United States Constitution conceived of as a means to 
curb the excesses of the executive.”89 The New Jersey Constitution 
provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the 
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the 
practice and procedure in all such courts.”90 The clause “subject to the 
law” grants the Legislature the power of molding procedure.91 However, 
when the issue first arose in court, Chief Justice Vanderbilt interpreted 
the provision to apply only to “substantive law” and not subject to 
“procedural law.”92 
Senators “could assert that confirmation is an excellent check upon 
a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to 
preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, 
from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to 
popularity.”93 The governor’s broad appointment power further 
enhances “[s]enators’ concern about placing limits on the appointment 
power of the executive.”94 The “Senate’s confirmation process provides 
an effective and constitutionally authorized restraint against arbitrary or 
ill-conceived gubernatorial appointments” as a method of employing the 
well-recognized constitutional doctrine of checks and balances.95 Thus, 
Senators must ensure that nominees are well-qualified and have been 
nominated on their merits, as opposed to favoritism or for political 
reasons, for this “noble and essential role.”96 
The state constitution simply suggests that the nomination will not 
proceed without the advice and consent of the Senate; it does not 
command that “the Senate ‘shall’ advise on and consent to an 
 
89 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  See also Martin, supra note 54, at 18. 
90 N.J. Const. art. VI, §  2, para. 3. 
91 Wefing, supra note 74, at 702-03. 
92 Id.; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 245 (1950). 
93 Martin, supra note 54, at 18 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 
76 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). However, Hamilton also believed that an independent 
judiciary, protected by life tenure, was the best way to secure a steady “and impartial 
administration of the laws.” See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961)). 
94 Martin, supra note 54, at 18-19; Wiley, supra note 81, at 65. 
95 Martin, supra note 54, at 19; Senatorial Courtesy Commission Report, reprinted in 99 
N.J. L. J. 505, 518 (1976) (noting Senatorial Courtesy Commission’s recognition of 
important constitutional role in maintaining system of checks and balances). 
96 Martin, supra note 54, at 18-19; Wiley, supra note 81, at 71. 
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appointment.”97 Consistent with the plain language of the constitution, 
the Senate Rules recognize that the Senate President may prevent the 
referral of a nomination to the Judiciary Committee.98 The Rules 
likewise instruct that without Senate action, a nomination will lapse.99 
The text of the Constitution places restraints on “ordering the Senate to 
confirm a nomination,” just as there is a restraint from “ordering the 
Governor to submit one.”100 Thus, the Senate acted within its textually 
granted authority. 
C. Chief Justice Rabner Acted Within his Authority 
Efforts to preserve the integrity of the judiciary or to safeguard its 
independence have led to many state inter-branch issues: “[c]ourts 
occasionally have been placed in the unenviable position of having to 
define their own status in the tripartite constitutional scheme . . . [this 
includes] needing to draw lines of demarcation consistent with accepted 
conventions and a system of checks and balances.”101 Accusations of 
judicial overreach and internal clashes result from judicial operations.102 
State courts hold both the burdens and the responsibility “for rule-
making and routine day-to-day management” of the courts.103 The 
members of the judiciary specifically “play an active, even aggressive, 
part in the governance of the state and . . . take a leadership role in legal 
development.”104 
The Constitution grants the Chief Justice the power to utilize, or 
“bring up,” someone for a single case; yet the Constitution places no 
 
97 De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 433 (1993). 
98 Id. See Rules of the Senate, R. 150 (providing that “[w]hen nominations shall be 
made by the Governor to the Senate, they shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate 
President, be referred to the Judiciary Committee.”). 
99 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 433. See Rules of the Senate, r. 154b (stating that “[a]ll 
nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during an annual session of the Senate shall not 
be acted upon in a subsequent annual session without being again made to the Senate by the 
Governor.”). 
100 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 433. 
101 Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1429-30. 
102 Id. at 1430. 
103 Id. 
104 Wefing, supra note 74, at 712. See also Michael Booth, Christie’s Ouster of Justice 
Wallace Tests State Constitution and it Passes, 200 N.J. L. J.  313, 313 (2010) (“If neither 
Christie nor the Senate blinks, the Court can carry on business as usual provided its 
constitutional quorum of five appointed members is maintained.”). 
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textual restriction for a continuance of this method.105 Chief Justices 
“have not considered themselves constrained” from making 
“nonquorum-related assignments” in the past.106 Because the rule that 
grants this authority has been established for decades, it constitutes a 
longstanding, unchallenged gloss on the constitutional language and is 
therefore entitled to some weight.107  The provision in New Jersey 
allowing the Chief Justice to “temporarily assign a judge to sit for an 
absent member of the Supreme Court”108 stands in contrast to the 
inability of the Supreme Court of the United States “to temporarily 
replace one of its absent justices.”109 It is unclear, however, when a 
temporary replacement may be effectuated.110 
At a minimum, the constitution permits the Chief Justice to assign 
a Superior Court judge for temporary service on the Court, but it is not 
clear whether that can be done for a purpose other than to meet the 
quorum requirement of five justices. As such, it is imperative to clarify 
whether the Chief Justice is permitted to recall retired Supreme Court 
justices and temporarily assign them to the Supreme Court, and whether 
a justice can even “decide cases after reaching the mandatory retirement 
age of seventy.”111 There are two competing views on this matter. 
Under a liberal interpretation, the court rules expressly allow the 
Chief Justice to utilize lower court and retired justices under a great 
variety of circumstances. As such, the Chief Justice may do so to 
“replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the 
business of the court,” circumstances beyond constituting quorum.112 
New Jersey Court Rule 2:13-2 grants the Chief Justice the power to 
temporarily assign an Appellate Division judge or a retired Supreme 
Court justice in order to “expedite the business of the court”113 but does 
 
105 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Frank Askin, Director of Rutgers Law 
School-Newark’s Constitutional Litigation Clinic, that “I don’t know that they can’t bring 
them up for all cases….”). 
106 Id. (quoting Robert Williams, Constitutional Law professor at Rutgers Law School-
Camden). 
107 Id. (quoting Earl Maltz, Constitutional Law professor at Rutgers Law School-
Camden). 
108 See N.J. Const. art. VI, §  2, para. 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:13-2 (West 2010); Hartnett, 
supra note 78, at 738. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 741. 
112 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553. 
113 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:13-2 (West 2010). 
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not expound on what qualifies as “temporary.” Thus, the constitution 
does not say the temporary assignment power exists only to regain 
quorum, and this provision authorizes the Court to promulgate rules 
fleshing out power, which may refer to other unforeseen circumstances. 
This has potential to implicate the supremacy of the State Constitution, 
were there a clear constitutional provision on the matter.114 Section 
43:6A-13 allows the Chief Justice to call up retired Supreme Court 
justices who are not practicing law.115 The mandatory retirement age116 
does not “prevent the utilization of such senior judges on a special 
assignment basis” at the direction of the Chief Justice.117 
Alternatively, the Temporary Assignment Provision can be read as 
a narrow, mandatory duty only applicable for making quorum; thus, the 
Chief Justice may not bring the court to seven members.118 Under this 
reasoning, a “temporary assignment should be made only when 
necessary to make a quorum,” and the “judge or judges assigned should 
be senior in service in the Superior Court.”119 Furthermore, the Chief 
Justice would not have the constitutional authority to fill a court seat on 
a temporary basis for any reason other than to make quorum.120 The text, 
in its context and its implementation for the first two decades of practice 
under the 1947 Constitution, could be said to support this proposition 
because the sentence allowing such assignments follows directly after 
the one stating the five-member quorum requirement.121 As originally 
 
114 George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 380-81 (1952) (“Where a statute, wholly 
procedural in its operation, is in conflict, either directly or by necessary implication, with a 
rule of procedure promulgated [by the Supreme Court] pursuant to the authority delegated to 
it under the Constitution, the latter must prevail.”). 
115 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-13 (West 2010). 
116 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 3. 
117 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 765; Statement accompanying Assemb. B. No. 1419 
(introduced April 1, 1974). 
118 Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631. 
119 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 741, 768. 
Not only are both the original and the revised Supreme Court rule consistent 
with interpreting the temporary assignment provision of the constitution as 
available only when necessary to make a quorum, but the very change made to 
the original rule by the revised rule confirms the appropriateness of treating the 
identical change made by the Judiciary Committee of the convention as stylistic.  
Id. 
120 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Earl Maltz, Constitutional Law professor 
at Rutgers Law School-Camden) (“Based on the language of Article VI, it ‘doesn’t say if the 
seat is vacant for a while that the Chief Justice can appoint someone.’”). 
121 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (“The rule, which would appear to allow Chief 
Justice Stuart Rabner to name a interim justice, is not valid because it goes beyond what the 
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drafted, the paragraph specifically referred to using the power when 
necessary to make quorum, and the paring of the quorum reference from 
the final version was a stylistic change.122 Also, Court Rule 2:13-2 first 
included “language about replacing absent justices and expediting court 
business” in 1967, but “the provision allowing appointment of retired 
justices” was not added until 1978.123 
New Jersey later adopted the requirement that justices do not 
receive tenure until they are reappointed, which could be interpreted to 
indicate that the framers “intended to permit the Governor and the 
Senate to consider the justices’ judicial decisions before 
reappointment.”124 Thus, based in part on its history, the constitution 
does not allow the Chief Justice to fill the vacancy as he chooses.125 
Furthermore, the constitution only authorizes temporary usages of 
senior Superior Court judges.126 Since 1971, justices have “participated 
in cases after retirement, ostensibly on the ground that the case was 
argued and submitted prior to retirement,” 127 but there is no provision 
expressly allowing retired justices to be called up for any duties beyond 
completing their work in progress. 
Moreover, it could be said that this rule should be applied narrowly 
because it is wrong to allow the Supreme Court to take license with the 
constitution, particularly with those provisions designed to cabin its 
own members’ power.128 The Chief Justice would essentially be granted 
“unfettered authority” if he or she were allowed to make “temporary 
assignments for nonquorum purposes, such as expediting court business 
as the rule states.”129 Accordingly, the Governor and Senate are 
 
Constitution allows…Instead, it is Gov. Chris Christie who has the constitutional power to 
fill the seat temporarily through a recess appointment.”). 
122 Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631. 
123 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553. 
124 Wefing, supra note 74, at 712. 
125 See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1. See also Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 
(“Adopted in 1947, it reads: ‘Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When 
necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in 
service: as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme 
Court.’”). 
126 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1. (“When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the 
Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service … to serve temporarily in the 
Supreme Court.”). See also Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 (quoting N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, 
para. 1). 
127 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 766. 
128 Hartnett, supra note 60, at 761. 
129 Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Earl Maltz, Constitutional Law professor 
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responsible for filling the Supreme Court bench, not the judges.130 
IV. EACH BRANCH ACTED WITH POOR FORESIGHT 
BECAUSE THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS HAVE 
DAMAGED AND COULD CONTINUE TO CAUSE GREATER 
DAMAGE TO THE NEW JERSEY POLITICAL SYSTEM 
The three branches of the New Jersey political system each acted 
within their textual authority; however, in doing so, each branch failed 
to take into account the best interests of the state, especially the court 
system.  There is simply no question about the intent of the framers of 
the Constitution: reappointment would be denied only when a judge was 
deemed unfit, a standard that ensured the independence of the state’s 
judiciary. Governor Richard J. Hughes, who was involved in the 1947 
Constitutional Convention, stated that “the purpose of the 
reappointment process was only to exclude someone who had turned 
out to be incompetent and was not intended to allow any consideration 
of a judge’s judicial opinions.”131 That standard, embraced and followed 
for almost seventy years, is imbued with constitutional value.132 No 
governor before now sought to control the third branch of government 
through the reappointment process; the threat to the New Jersey 
Judiciary and overall state system will inevitably suffer because of the 
Governor’s actions. 
A. The Current Situation in New Jersey Represents a Classic Case 
of Separation of Powers with the Three Co-Equal Branches of 
Government at Odds with Each Other, Thereby Threatening 
Judicial Independence 
The state constitution employs the separation of powers doctrine as 
a means of distinguishing between the three branches of government.133 
There exists an underlying general recognition that this tripartite system 
“was intended to allocate to the political branches of government a 
 
at Rutgers Law School-Camden). 
130 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 631. 
131 Wefing, supra note 74, at 712-713 (quoting John B. Wefing, Richard J. Hughes--
Public Servant, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 411, 415 (1993)). 
132 Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9. 
133 N.J. Const. art. III, § 1, para. 1. (stating that the “powers of the government shall be 
divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or 
persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.”). 
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competence to reach ultimate decisions and to engage in practices that 
are not subject to judicial supervision or review.”134 The “exercise of 
separated power” by the three branches is complimented and mediated 
by a system of checks and balances that has the potential to intermingle 
the powers of one branch with another.135 Thus, counter-balancing 
devices guard against an excessive accumulation of power in any one 
branch, while “the rigors of separation are qualified and government is 
more workable.”136 Because this framework is “beset by incongruities 
and confining modifiers,” the separation principle has evolved and 
resolved a commingling of responsibilities.137 
Despite this framework’s protection, the separation of powers of 
the three branches of New Jersey’s government is in jeopardy. Each 
branch is attempting to usurp power from one another, instead of 
working together and utilizing each other to reach a positive result. 
Here, the system of checks and balances is successfully limiting any one 
branch from gaining complete control: the Governor is asserting control 
over the court by using his appointment power; the Senate is defiant 
regarding its decision to not affirm the governor’s nomination; and the 
Court is utilizing judges as it sees fit. However, this excessive 
entanglement is not what the framers of the 1947 Constitution 
envisioned; these separate branches should be working through conflict, 
rather than exacerbating it. 
The independence of courts holds a special place in the institution 
of American government,138 as there is a  “fundamental relation between 
the quality of judges and the proper administration of justice.”139 The 
maintenance of judicial independence was of primary concern in the late 
eighteenth century when Alexander Hamilton “warned of the ‘natural 
feebleness of the judiciary’” and of the “need to ensure that courts are 
not overawed by the other branches,” and that concern remains the same 
 
134 Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 167 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1969). 
135 Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1422. See PROXIMATE SOLUTIONS: CASE-PROBLEMS 
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 150-206 (G. Theodore Mitau & Harold W. Chase eds., 
1964) (providing brief case excerpts of state delegation issues). 
136 Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1422. PROXIMATE SOLUTIONS, supra note 137, at 
150-51 (discussing the evolution and judicial acceptance of congressional delegation). 
137 Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1422. 
138 Id. at 1441-42. See also Maryellen Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline: 
Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 207, 212 (1983) (“This 
function of judicial independence plays an important role in the overall constitutional 
structure.”). 
139 ARTHUR VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 3 (1949).  
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today.140 
The method of appointment is “the most important factor 
supporting the independence of the Judiciary.”141 With the advice and 
consent of the senate, the governor appoints members of the judiciary 
for a seven-year term.142 Reappointment uses the same system, and if the 
Governor reappoints the justice, the justice remains on the court until 
the mandatory retirement age of seventy.143 
A “system of appointment rather than election” allows for a more 
independent judiciary.144 Only nine states, including New Jersey, lack 
any election element within the judicial appointment process.145 The 
large majority of states that “have appointment by the Governor for the 
initial selection include a retention election,” and many more “have 
partisan or non-partisan elections.146 While in a sense more democratic, 
those systems have the tendency to impede the judiciary’s 
independence.”147 The founders understood “the importance of strong, 
co-equal branches of government to best serve the people of [the] State 
[and] those guiding principles remain vital today.”148 
An independent judiciary is necessary to our form of government, 
and no judge should have to fear that the outcome of a specific case will 
be used as a standard for reappointment.149 Citizens who turn to the 
courts for relief are entitled to have their cases resolved by impartial 
judges who focus only on the evenhanded pursuit of justice. Litigants 
 
140 Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1430-31 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
141 Wefing, supra note 74, at 714. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. (Justices after retirement can be recalled but do not serve on the Supreme Court). 
144 Id. at 715 (“It is not surprising that the New York and the New Jersey state courts are 
activist bodies. Their judges are appointed by the Governor, not elected, and that offers 
them some protection from irate voters.” W. John Moore, In Whose Court?, 23 NAT’L J. 
2396 (1991).  
145 Wefing, supra note 74, at 714. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Statement of Chief Justice Stuart Rabner issued to all justices and judges of New 
Jersey. Evan H. Krinick, Governor’s Replacement of Justice Wallace Bucks More Than Half 
a Century of Constitutional Tradition, 200 N.J. L. J.  329, 329 (2010).  
149 Chief Justice Rabner said, in a statement to justices and judges, “[w]e have entered a 
phase when judges of this state may begin to fear political retribution depending on how 
they decide a case.” Editorial, Justice John E. Wallace OUSTED, supra note 21; Battle over 
Justice John Wallace puts a lot at risk, THE STAR LEDGER EDITORIAL PAGE (May 17, 2010, 
6:56 PM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2010/05/post_8.html. 
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should never have to worry that a judge may be more concerned about 
how a decision could affect his or her appointment.150 Contrarily, proper 
considerations of judicial restraint should require that every judge think 
about each decision in the context of its impact on the state’s system of 
government and whether it will serve to undermine the respect and 
deference that is required for a court to be truly independent. 
Judicial independence is a democratic precept that is “critical to 
maintain the rule of law, unaffected by political concerns.”151 The 
framers of the 1947 constitution intended to create a “powerful, 
independent judiciary, free to interpret the law using its best judgment 
without regard to the political considerations of the moment;” this 
independence reinforces “protections for individual rights and acts as a 
check on the worst” temptations of democracy.152 
B. These Actions Threaten Legitimacy and Have Politicized the 
Court 
Governors generally select justices with their same ideological 
viewpoints.153 But how deeply has Governor Christie’s decision shaken 
the pillars of the state’s legal establishment? Not only has his decision 
been a “radical and unprecedented assault on judicial independence, 
[but i]t sets a precedent that will allow governors of both parties 
eventually to reduce the Court to a body of temporary appointees with 
membership fluctuating in accord with the political cycle.”154 Governor 
Christie is sending the message that “there will be no judicial 
independence during his administration” unless things are done his 
way.155 He argued that if justices fear not getting reappointed, then “they 
care more about keeping their job than doing their job.”156 Nevertheless, 
 
150 Justice John E. Wallace OUSTED: Anne M. Patterson Picked to Replace Only Black 
Justice on NJ Supreme Court by Chris Christie, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2010), 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/04/justice-john-e-wallace-
ou_n_562640.html. 
151 Statement of Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, supra note 149; Krinick supra note 149, at 
329. 
152 Editorial, Judicial Independence, 200 N.J. L. J. 334, 334 (2010). 
153 Wefing, supra note 74, at 723. 
154 Editorial, Judicial Independence, supra note 152, at 334. 
155 Robert A. Fall, J.S.C. (Ret.), Governor, in Rejecting Wallace, Misrepresented 
Justice’s Record, Says Former Judge, 200 N.J. L. J. 401, 401 (2010).  
156 Christie: Justices Too Concerned With Keeping Jobs Shouldn’t Be on Court, 200 
N.J. L. J. 393, 393 (2010). 
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justices must be permitted to adjudicate without fear of retaliation.157 
Politically critical cases will “inevitably come before the Supreme 
Court.”158 Rampant discretion “in choosing a lower court judge to fill an 
ad hoc vacancy” will certainly diminish respect for the court and could 
lead to discord among current justices.159 For example, on December 10, 
2010, Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto issued an opinion calling the length 
of Judge Stern’s temporary assignment unconstitutional.160 Explaining 
why he was not taking part in the unrelated ruling on a racial 
discrimination case, Justice Rivera-Soto wrote that he would abstain 
from all decisions as long as Judge Stern was on the Court.161 Justice 
Rivera-Soto reasoned that “any such assignment at this juncture simply 
is not necessary” because the Court had a quorum.162 Senate President 
Sweeney called on Justice Rivera-Soto to resign.163 Justice Helen E. 
Hoens of the Supreme Court wrote that she, too, had “grave reservations 
 
157 Henry Gottlieb, N.J. Governor Rebuffs Former Justices’ Request That He Rethink 
Ouster of High Court Judge, 200 N.J. L. J. 313, 313 (2010) (quoting retired justices: Former 
Chief Justices Deborah Poritz and James Zazzali and Associate Justices Robert Clifford, 
James Coleman Jr., Gary Stein, Marie Garibaldi, Alan Handler and Stewart Pollock). 
158 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 760. 
159 Id. 
160 Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 354-72 (2010) (Rivera-Soto, J. 
abstaining). Justice Rivera-Soto then stated that he would “cast a substantive vote in every 
case in which the judge of the Superior Court temporarily assigned to serve on the Supreme 
Court participates except for those in which the temporarily assigned judge casts a vote that 
affects the outcome of the case.” Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Prop. 
Group Dev. Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 587 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting). 
161 Henry, 204 N.J. at 354 (Rivera-Soto, J. abstaining). Justice Rivera-Soto explained 
the reason for his abstention: 
Today, while constituted as one Chief Justice, five Associate Justices and a 
Judge of the Appellate Division selected unilaterally by the Chief Justice, the 
Court has rendered a decision in this matter. The Court as so constituted is 
unconstitutional and its acts are ultra vires for three principal reasons. First, the 
Constitution allows the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to serve on the 
Supreme Court only when necessary, and any such assignment at this juncture 
simply is not necessary. Further, the methodology this Court has adopted for the 
selection of who is to serve on assignment to the Supreme Court does not 
comport with the clear constitutional mandate. Finally, the assignment of a 
Superior Court Judge to serve on this Court to fill a vacancy resulting from a 
political impasse between the Executive and the Legislative Branches thrusts 
the Judiciary into that political thicket, all the while improperly advancing one 
side’s views in preference over the other’s. For each of those reasons, I abstain. 
162 Id. at 354. 
163 Richard Pérez-Peña, Appointment Fight Divides Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, 
at A19. 
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about the temporary appointment but did not formally oppose it.”164 
After an extended period of refusal, Justice Rivero-Soto voted on a case, 
an act which seemed to attract more criticism than his initial protest; 
critics argued that he came and went as he pleased, with little regard for 
the integrity of the justice system.165 
In Lewis v. Harris,166 Chief Justice Rabner and Justices Rivera-Soto 
and Hoens, who all face renomination and reconfirmation,167 voted to 
deny the motion to recognize same-sex marriage in New Jersey.168 The 
dissents came from three justices tenured until mandatory retirement at 
age seventy: Virginia Long, Jaynee Lavecchia and Barry Albin.169 The 
majority recognized that this case raised a matter of “general public 
importance” and “constitutional significance,”170 yet nothing resulted 
because a majority of four votes were required to grant the motion. 
Assemblyman John McKeon said that “he did not want to besmirch the 
integrity of the court,” but “when split rulings are handed down in this 
manner, it is inevitable that individuals would be left with the view that 
 
164 Id. 
165 Democrats, already enraged by Rivera-Soto’s earlier decision to abstain, renewed 
calls for him to step down. “This is as bad as it could get…[h]e is making a mockery out of 
his position as justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court and putting himself above the law, 
as he alone determines. . . . Sen. Raymond Lesniak (D-Union), one of the justice’s harshest 
critics, called the decision ‘bizarre.’” Chris Megerian, N.J. Supreme Court Justice Rivera-
Soto Tempers Stance on Abstention, NJ.COM (Jan. 13, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/shell_supreme_court_justice_ri.html. 
166 202 N.J. 340 (2010). 
167 Chief Justice Rabner’s and Justice Hoens’s terms will expire before 2014; Justice 
Long will reach mandatory retirement in 2012. Supreme Court of New Jersey: Supreme 
Court Justices’ Biographies, NEW JERSEY COURTS ONLINE (2011), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/index.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
168 See generally Lewis v. Harris, 202 N.J. 340 (2010). The claimants in Lewis v. Harris 
motioned for review pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 (“motion in aid of litigants rights”), which, if 
granted, would bypass the trial stage. If such a motion were granted, the Supreme Court 
would have granted expedited review to the case arguing for same-sex marriage, but the 
motion itself does not mean that same-sex marriage would be recognized by granting the 
motion. 
169 See generally id. See also Matt Friedman, N.J. Supreme Court Declines to Hear Gay 
Marriage Case Filed by 6 Same-sex Couples, NJ.COM (Jul. 27, 2010, 6:49 AM), 
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/nj_supreme_court_declines_same.html. 
Legislators who raised the issue of whether at least three members of the court might have 
been afraid to touch the gay marriage case because Christie can remove them by appointing 
other justices. Bob Braun, N.J. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear gay marriage case raises 
question of Christie’s influence, NJ.COM (Aug. 16, 2010, 10:35 AM), 
http://blog.nj.com/njv_bob_braun/2010/08/nj_supreme_court_justices_who.html. 
170 Lewis, 202 N.J. at 341. 
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the court’s decision was politicized.”171 Therefore, the lack of a full 
bench effectively makes the Appellate Division the deciding level, 
erasing the legitimacy that the New Jersey Supreme Court ought to 
have. 
Judicial appointments may be said to be inevitably political; yet the 
issue is not whether judicial selection can be removed from politics, but 
“how the public’s interest in obtaining the most competent, 
disinterested, and independent judges” to the Supreme Court can be 
met.172 The New Jersey court system is unique in that the Supreme Court 
is required to be partisan-balanced; though unwritten, Governors must 
maintain a “four/three party affiliation split” on the Court, a balance 
seen as a “powerful restraint on court ‘packing’ or other means of 
exerting political pressure on an independent judiciary.”173 Because this 
tradition is unwritten, there is debate as to how many seats on the bench 
must be allocated to each party174; however, at a bare minimum, it seems 
there must be no more than three members of a political affiliation 
sitting as justices.175 Therefore, the Governor may not completely 
restructure the court in any one direction because of the restrictions on 
party balance. As mentioned earlier, governors generally select justices 
with their same ideological viewpoints.176 This practice creates a 
nonpartisan balance because it is bipartisan by design. An independent, 
nonpartisan judiciary creates a strong backbone of reliable 
jurisprudence in the court’s jurisdiction. For example, in Bush v. Gore,177 
 
171 Friedman, supra note 169. Legislators who raised the issue of whether at least three 
members of the court might have been afraid to touch the gay marriage case because 
Christie can remove them by appointing other justices. Braun, supra note 169. 
172 Seiler, supra note 12, at 725. 
173 Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9. 
174 See Letter from Arthur T. Vanderbilt to the Committee on the Judiciary (July 29, 
1947), in 4 N.J. Const. Conv., at 729. There appear to be two different interpretations of the 
balance: either no more than four from one party, or there must be at least three from each 
political party and the governor can pick the seventh justice.  
175 Wefing, supra note 74, at 715-16 (“One of the virtually unique aspects of the New 
Jersey system is its unwritten but institutionalized requirement that the court be kept 
politically balanced. While the Governor theoretically has the power to appoint anyone of 
any political party, because there is no constitutional or statutory authority restricting his or 
her choice, the courts in New Jersey, including the supreme court, have always been kept 
politically balanced. There always will be at least three Republicans and three Democrats on 
the court, and one additional member from either party. This is virtually unique when 
looking at states across the country. This balance keeps governors from having the ability to 
totally reconstruct the court in any one direction.”). 
176 Id. at 723. 
177 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court had little faith in the Florida Supreme Court, in 
part because it was Republican-dominated and very partisan.178 There 
can, and should, be more trust in the Supreme Court because it is 
nonpartisan; thus, it is important to retain a partisan balance in order to 
promote the tradition and reliability for which the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has gained national recognition. 
V. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO 
REMEDY THE SITUATION AND PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE 
OF THIS STALEMATE 
The Constitution worked in this situation: “Governor Chris 
Christie exercised his power not to reappoint Justice John Wallace, Jr.; 
the Senate exercised its power not to confirm Christie’s choice of 
replacement, Anne Patterson;” and Chief Justice Rabner’s “power to 
assign a temporary replacement for Wallace” occurred without official 
protest.179 The three governmental branches, however, acted to the 
overall detriment of the state’s political system. New Jersey is in need 
of a new approach to remedy the current situation, and perhaps an 
entirely new system should be considered in order to prevent this novel 
chain of events from happening again. It is problematic that the decision 
for this needed change is not currently allocated to the particular branch 
of government best utilized to accomplish such a move. Most 
importantly, each branch must practice the exercise of legitimate power 
to produce a logical, working result. 
The most logical solution to remedy this issue would be to enact a 
constitutional amendment with specific provisions laying out who may 
or may not appoint an interim justice and the qualifications of that 
interim justice. To amend the Constitution is a very difficult process,180 
and must be done with great care and specificity so as to be properly 
applied to future issues that may arise. 
 
178 See generally Bush, 531 U.S. at 107-08 (stating in dicta that Article II requires the 
Supreme Court’s revision of the state court’s construction of state laws in order to protect 
one organ of the State from another). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the 
Florida Supreme Court’s decision because of considerable uncertainty as to the grounds on 
which it was based. Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000). 
Three concurring justices also asserted that the Florida Supreme Court had violated Article 
II, § 1, cl. 2 of the Constitution, by misinterpreting Florida election law that had been 
enacted by the Florida Legislature. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112-19. 
179 Booth, supra note 104, at 313.  
180 N.J. Const. art. IX, § 1, para. 1-7. 
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To bypass this problem, a constitutional amendment could be 
adopted providing for the popular election, rather than the appointment, 
of judges. Many states continue to rely on elections to determine 
judicial selection, by means of both partisan elections181 and nonpartisan 
elections.182 Proponents of the former contend that “elections make 
judges more politically accountable.”183 Advocates of nonpartisan 
elections assert that “such elections remove the undesirable political 
factors from the selection process while still retaining popular control 
over the judiciary.”184 Unfortunately, elections, whether partisan or 
nonpartisan, produce their own set of problems. Chief Justice 
Vanderbilt warned that if New Jersey were to convert to such a system, 
it would lessen “the independence of the judiciary by making politics a 
primary element in their [sic] selection and continuance in office.”185 
Critics of this process may also argue “voter selection of judges is 
impractical because the qualifications of judicial candidates are seldom 
known or appreciated by many voters.”186 
Alternatively, the judicial appointment term could be limited to 
one single term for ten years.187 The proposal would “partially rein in 
 
181 Id. Nine states employed partisan elections during the 1990s: Alabama, Arkansas, 
Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. 
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS. THE BOOK OF THE STATES 135-37 (1998). Under this 
system, political parties nominate judicial candidates through primaries or party 
conventions. MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY - SELECTION, 
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 8 (1987). In the general election, these candidates 
appear on the voting line with their political party. Id. 
182 Martin, supra note 54, at 58. In recent years, thirteen states held nonpartisan 
elections: Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra 
note 180, at 9.  In these states, candidates have been chosen by primaries or nominating 
conventions but have appeared on the ballot during the general election without a designated 
party affiliation. Id. 
183 Martin, supra note 54, at 57. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 47-52 (1980). 
184 Martin, supra note 54, at 57. See Thomas E. Brennan, Nonpartisan Election of 
Judges: The Michigan Case, 40 SW. L. J. 23, 23-24 (emphasizing the strengths of 
nonpartisan judicial elections and the superiority of this system over partisan elections). 
185 Martin, supra note 54, at 57-58 (quoting Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors: 
Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1956)). 
186 Seiler, supra note 12, at 733. 
187 Martin, supra note 54, at 60. See S. Con. Res. 128, 205th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.J. 1993). 
This Senate Concurrent Resolution was first introduced by Senator Louis Bassano (R-
Union) on September 13, 1993. Id. No action has ever been taken on Senator Bassano’s 
resolution, although he has continued to seek its passage. Id. (citing an interview with Louis 
Bassano, Senator, New Jersey State Legislature, in Trenton, N.J. (Mar. 20, 2000)). 
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judicial independence by infusing the bench with a steady influx of 
judges, presumably judges more attuned to the ideology and concerns of 
the current governor and senators.”188 This approach could also “more 
readily alleviate instances of judicial infirmity and incompetence” by 
institutionalizing a relatively quick and easy turnover.189 Such an 
approach, however, “would also deprive New Jersey of a large cadre of 
knowledgeable and experienced judges.”190 Moreover, it seems likely 
that many qualified lawyers would be reluctant to withdraw from their 
lucrative practices for one single term on the bench, as opposed to 
judicial service as an admirable career.191 More likely, those attorneys 
most inclined to do so would be older, in solo practice or small firms, 
and “attracted more by the retirement benefits and prestige of serving on 
the bench than the opportunity for service.”192 
This appointive approach may be further problematic, however, 
because although “the judicial function is circumscribed by precedent, 
rules of procedure, and the character of the cases presented,” judges 
often do “exert a decisive influence on basic political philosophy,”193 and 
the constant turn-around could lead to inconsistent precedent. This may 
also go against the intent of the framers of the 1947 Constitution.194 
Regardless of which branch should be the determining factor in 
appointing an interim justice, the route to implementing such a decision 
must be examined. The governor is not in a position to propose laws, 
 
188 Martin, supra note 54, at 60. 
189 Id. See also William G. Ross, The Hazards of Proposals to Limit the Tenure of 
Federal Judges and to Permit Judicial Removal Without Impeachment, 35 VILL. L. REV. 
1063, 1065 (1990). Ross discusses federal proposals, but the same arguments can be made 
at the state level in a state like New Jersey, which currently provides lifetime tenure after a 
judge or justice is successfully reappointed after one seven-year term. Id. As the title of his 
article suggests, Ross takes the position that limiting lifetime tenure creates more problems 
than it corrects. See id. 
190 Martin, supra note 54, at 60. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. Under present state law, judges acquire pension and health benefits after ten 
years of service. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-8 (West 2011). One ten-year term would 
therefore make judges eligible for these benefits. See id. 
193 Seiler, supra note 12, at 733.  
194 “[I]t is only fair that any new [judicial] appointments under this new constitution 
shall go through the trial period of one term. If they are qualified they have no fear of not 
being re-appointed.” N.J. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Vol. 1, at 589 (1947) (excerpted 
statement by state Sen. Frank ‘Hap’ Farley in support of the successful amendment to the 
judiciary article at New Jersey’s 1947 Constitutional Convention, providing that supreme 
court justices, like lower court judges, be appointed for a seven-year term subject to 
reappointment and tenure). 
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nor does he have the granted authority to directly control the court. 
Nonetheless, he is the sole administrator of executive authority.195 It is 
through this broad provision alone that the governor may be within his 
right to assert the need for balance between the respective roles of the 
government’s three branches. Maintaining balance between the tripartite 
systems unfortunately does not lead to issuing an ultimate rule on this 
situation. At best, the governor can communicate with and make 
recommendations to the legislature on what measures he recommends.196 
In the alternative, the Supreme Court retains the right to “make 
rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject 
to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts.”197 When the 
case of Winberry v. Salisbury198 came before the Supreme Court in 1950, 
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, writing for the majority, stated that the 
constitutional provision giving the Court rule-making powers over 
practice and procedure was exclusive, except for matters of substantive 
law.199 It follows that the Court has the authority to make its own rules. 
Problems arise, however, in that the Court would be able “to take 
license with the constitution” by defining its own power, “particularly 
with those provisions designed” to regulate its own members.200 This 
stands in stark contrast to the doctrine of “checks and balances” upon 
which the nation’s democratic principles lay. 
Though there may be a concern of justiciability, the New Jersey 
Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution,201 does not “confine the 
exercise of the judicial power to actual cases and controversies.”202 
Courts “normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer 
exists and the disputed issues . . . become moot,” though this is with 
 
195 N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 1. See supra Part II (A). 
196 N.J. Const. art. V, § 1. para. 12.  
197 N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 3. 
198 5 N.J. 240 (1950). 
199 Id. at 242-55. Contra Allen V. Lowenstein, The Legacy of Arthur T. Vanderbilt to 
the New Jersey Bar, 51 RUTGERS L. REV., 1319, 1340 (1999) (“Later scholars and 
commentators, including Justice Brennan, have recognized that Winberry v. Salisbury 
essentially was decided on the basis that the end justified the means, and that Case’s 
concurring opinion reflected accurately what the law should have been.”). 
200 Hartnett, supra note 78, at 761. 
201 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court cautioned 
against rendering advisory opinions or exercising its jurisdiction in the abstract. 521 U.S. 
507, 524 (1997). 
202 See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 1, para. 1. See also De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428 
(1993); In re J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. 101, 104 (1988).  
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exception.203  For example, courts will entertain a case that became moot 
when “the issue is of significant public importance and is likely to 
recur.”204 Consequently, this issue would be justiciable, though 
inevitably controversial. 
The Legislative Branch holds the power to make laws205; thus, an 
amendment to the constitution would be the Senate’s most useful and 
effective strategy.206 Any such law or amendment should be made in 
accordance with the state constitution, in order to have a seamless 
implementation of the law. A constitutional amendment is an 
overwhelming endeavor and may take a very long time to implement 
effectively. 
The independent New Jersey State Bar Association may be an 
additional avenue for change. This entity furthered many reforms 
through the years, and has several committees through which this issue 
can be addressed.207 Its mission is “to serve as the voice of New Jersey 
attorneys to other organizations, governmental entities and the public 
with regard to the law, legal profession and legal system.”208 Reform 
through this channel may be most practical for immediate progress, as it 
will not have to wait for the procedural hurdles that the three branches 
may face. This may also be the most viable option because of its general 
independence from political ties and the strength of its members’ 
reputations and backgrounds. However, the Association is unelected 
and un-appointed and essentially accountable to no one but its members. 
 
203 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 428. See Oxfeld v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 344 A.2d 
769, 771-72 (1974). A case is technically moot when the original issue presented has been 
resolved, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation. De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 
428. In some circumstances, however, New Jersey courts will entertain a case despite its 
mootness. Id. 
204 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 428 (citing In re J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. at 104 
(citations omitted)) (“While we ordinarily refuse to examine moot matters due to our 
reluctance to render legal decisions in the abstract and our desire to conserve judicial 
resources, we will rule on such matters where they are of substantial importance and are 
capable of repetition yet evade review.”); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342 (1985); Clark v. 
Degnan, 83 N.J. 393, 397 (1980). 
205 N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, para. 1. 
206 N.J. Const. art. IX, § 1, para. 1. 
207 For example, the Judicial Administration Committee is tasked with “ensuring the 
independence of judges, practicing attorneys and administrators….” NEW JERSEY STATE 
BAR ASSOCIATION- JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, 
http://www.njsba.com/about/standing-committees/judicial-administration-committee.html 
(last visited October 2, 2011).  
208 N.J. State Bar Ass’n, Mission Statement, ¶ 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.njsba.com/about/index.html. 
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Thus, it may be dangerous to give such an entity this power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is vital that all three branches of the New Jersey government act 
together in order to prevent a stalemate such as the current judicial 
situation from happening again or else new issues and ramifications will 
arise. All three branches must exercise their legitimate, constitutionally 
granted power to produce a logical result in the New Jersey political 
system. This philosophy is critical to preserve the dignity and 
effectiveness of “all governmental institutions by honoring the role 
ascribed to each branch by the 1947 state Constitution”;209 it is also 
imperative to keep in mind the intent and not solely the textually 
granted authority transcribed in the constitution. The branches of 
government ought not to make multifarious or diverging 
announcements concerning policy; debate adds to the democratic 
process, but a prolonged stalemate benefits no one. 
Ultimately, the Senate ought to propose a bill210 and subsequently 
pass a law or amendment directing the interim appointment process and 
designating the appointer’s role; this would procedurally be the least 
controversial route. This will inevitably require more than merely 
writing a bill; to enhance legitimacy, the Senate should appoint a 
commission to assist in the process.211 The governor could also publicly 
enforce the legislative mandate in accordance with the senate’s 
directive.212 The Senate, like the governor, is part of a co-equal branch 
with which the court may disagree, but which, notwithstanding its 
disagreement, the court must respect.213 The formulating of niform rules 
 
209 Castro, supra note 72, at 688. 
210 See N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, para. 6.  
211 “The Legislature may appoint any commission, committee or other body whose 
main purpose is to aid or assist it in performing its functions. Members of the Legislature 
may be appointed to serve on any such body.” N.J. Const. art. IV, § 5, para. 2. “The 
Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 
11. 
212 “To this end he shall have power, by appropriate action or proceeding in the courts 
brought in the name of the State, to enforce compliance with any constitutional or legislative 
mandate, or to restrain violation of any constitutional or legislative power or duty, by any 
officer, department or agency of the State; but this power shall not be construed to authorize 
any action or proceeding against the Legislature.” N.J. Const. art. V, §1 para. 11. 
213 De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 433. In a republican government, the judiciary ought to 
construe the legislature’s enactments. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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to determine the correct process and decision-making authority based on 
this potentially recurring circumstance is essential. The governor and 
lawmakers must hold fast to the highest ideals of integrity and 
impartiality when evaluating candidates for the bench and those judges 
eligible for reappointment; the fair administration of justice depends on 
it. 
The time is ripe to remedy this issue because two current justices 
will be up for reappointment and one will reach mandatory retirement 
age during the remainder of Governor Christie’s term.214 All of the 
governmental actors involved must work together to resolve this 




214 Chief Justice Rabner’s and Justice Hoens’s terms will expire before 2014; Justice 
Long will reach mandatory retirement in 2012. Supreme Court of New Jersey: Supreme 
Court Justices’ Biographies, NEW JERSEY COURTS ONLINE (2011), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/index.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2011). 
